【活动三】数据科学与管理工程学系学术讲座系列NO.74——Capacity Auctions : VCG Mechanism vs. Submodularity 2019/06/19时间：周三上午9:30-11:00
地点：浙大紫金港校区行政楼1102会议室
主讲人：Professor Bo Chen，University of Warwick, UK
讲座摘要：
Using supply chain as an example, we study a form of capacity mechanism that combines capacity and supply auctions. We characterize how participants bid in this auction and show that, on a pay-as-bid basis, an equilibrium behavior gives Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) profits and achieves efficient outcomes when there is submodularity, which is in stark contrast with what in the existing literature— at equilibrium VCG payments achieve truthful bids and efficiency. We also provide some necessary and sufficient conditions for submodularity.
嘉宾简介：
Professor Bo Chen (陈礴), Chair of Operations Research & Management Science and Co-director of DIMAP (Centre for Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications), University of Warwick, UK. He is Fellow of the UK Operational Research Society (FORS), Fellow of the UK Institute of Mathematics and Its Applications (FIMA), and Fellow of the UK Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS). He has been a Nominator for Nobel Prize in Economics since 2006. He currently serves as Associate Editor for ten international academic journals of high standing. His main research interests include optimization, scheduling and transportation, and game theory with mechanism design.